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ABSTRACT
The emerging reality of wireless sensor networks deployed
as long-lived infrastructure required to serve multiple appli-
cations necessitates the development of fine-grained security
support. Specifically, to allow sensor nodes to participate in
multiple concurrent applications, access control is required
on a per-application basis. This paper presents a policy-
driven security architecture for wireless sensor networks that
addresses the concern of fine-grained access control and se-
cure deployment of security policies, while respecting the
resource-constrained nature of wireless sensor networks. A
prototype of this system has been realized and evaluated us-
ing the LooCI component model and the Sun SPOT sensor
network platform.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Access controls, Au-
thentication
General Terms
Security, Design, Performance
Keywords
Security, Component models, Policy-based Management
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
have evolved into long-lived infrastructure on which various
applications from multiple actors may be deployed. Pre-
vious work [1, 3] has showed that run-time reconfigurable
component models are a good fit to deal with the dynamic,
resource-constrained characteristics of WSNs, in combina-
tion with their ability to support changing application re-
quirements over time. However, to effectively enable the
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sharing of WSN infrastructure amongst various applications
over time, security plays a crucial role in controlling inter-
actions between the components that compose applications.
To date, a number of security solutions for WSNs have
been proposed in the literature [4], which provide some level
of access control by using different authentication schemes
comprising of digital signatures, hashing functions, and sym-
metric or asymmetric keying. However, each of these ap-
proaches operate at a coarse-grained level, as they provide
a level of entity authentication which considers complete
nodes as endpoints. For example, by using these mecha-
nisms, a node is either allowed or disallowed full access to
another node. In this work, we envision an access control ar-
chitecture that provides a more fine-grained level of control
where the administrative owner of a node can set policies
authorizing access to a particular set of application compo-
nents or interfaces, rather than to the entire node.
Consider, for example, a custom-made WSN operated by
a transport company to monitor temperature inside each of
their trailers. Trailers can be picked up by trucks of different
companies; when a truck company picks up a trailer, the on-
board fleet management system connects to the WSN in the
trailer to collect temperature data. The company can access
the temperature service, but cannot read product and owner
identification data, change alarm thresholds, or activate ad-
ditional services for humidity, light or vibration sensing.
In this context, we advocate for a per-application access
control model in WSNs, which allows the divergent secu-
rity requirements of co-existing applications to be respected.
Our approach is based on a high-level and policy-based way
for specifying security. This allows for a clean separation of
concerns between, on the one hand, WSN software develop-
ment and, on the other, WSN administration. Furthermore,
support for the dynamic deployment of security policies al-
lows WSN security policies to evolve to meet changing ap-
plication requirements and regulations.
2. FINE-GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL IN
SENSOR NETWORKS
Our approach to realizing fine-grained access control in
WSNs is based upon three elements:
• A loosely-coupled WSN component model, named LooCI
[1], that allows for easy inspection of data flows be-
tween the components that compose applications.
• A flexible and extensible security policy engine, which
allows for fine-grained control of data flows and ensures
that these policies can not be circumvented.
• A secure policy distribution channel, which ensures that
only authorized actors may deploy security policies.
The Loosely-coupled Component Infrastructure (LooCI)
[1] is a run-time reconfigurable component model follow-
ing a fully decentralized publish-subscribe interaction model.
LooCI components support run-time reconfiguration, inter-
face definitions, introspection, and support for the re-wiring
of component bindings. Following this model, applications
are implemented as LooCI components that define their pro-
vided interfaces as the set of LooCI events they publish,
whereas the receptacles of a LooCI component are similarly
defined as the events to which they subscribe.
2.1 LooCI Access Control Policy Engine
As illustrated in Figure 1, to control interactions between
different application components, a supporting policy frame-
work is deployed on each sensor node consisting of a Policy
Engine that evaluates all component interactions against a
set of policy rules, and a Secure Policy Distribution com-
ponent (discussed in Section 2.2). In this context, we ap-
ply flexible access control policies that follow simple Event-
Condition-Action (ECA) semantics:
policy "allow temperature aggregation" "1" {
on GET_TEMP as t; //all temperature events
if( t.src == node_B &&
t.src_comp == TEMP_AGGREGATION &&
t.dest_comp == TEMP_SENSOR )
then( allow t; )
}
Listing 1: Example access control policy
Listing 1 illustrates an example access control policy, writ-
ten by a policy administrator and deployed on node A (see
Figure 1). The policy allows all GET TEMP events to pass
between a TEMP AGGREGATION component on node B
and the TEMP SENSOR component on node A.
Each time an event that is passed between two compo-
nents is received on the Event Bus, the Policy Engine eval-
uates whether it should be allowed to proceed based upon a
set of per-node policy rules. If the incoming event matches a
policy rule, the associated event (allow or deny) will be ap-
plied, whereas the default policy to deal with is deny all. To
resolve potential conflicts between multiple matching poli-
cies, we follow a priority-based ordering of policies, whereas
only the actions of the policy with the highest priority are
executed. For more details about the specification of policies
and the corresponding framework, we refer to [3].
These policies provide a simple, yet powerful method of
controlling access at multiple levels, from coarse-grained
node-level access control used to control all interactions be-
tween nodes, fine-grained component-level access control to
govern interactions between two components, and super-
fine-grained interface-level access control used to control
very specific interactions between component interfaces. Fur-
thermore, we provide tool support for policy administrators,
allowing them to easily select which nodes, components or
interfaces they wish to apply access control policies to.
2.2 Secure Policy Deployment
As access control policies provide control over all aspects
of component interaction on the network, it is particularly
critical that these policies are disseminated in a secure fash-
ion. Hence, policy distribution is performed over a dedicated
Figure 1: The LooCI Policy Framework
security bus between the authorized policy administrator
back-end, the WSN gateway, and each sensor node.
To deploy a policy on a particular sensor node, a secure
connection between the policy administrator back-end and
WSN gateway is set up using standard enterprise-grade secu-
rity technologies such as TLS/SSL over which the digitally
signed policy is transferred. Secondly, the WSN gateway
verifies the identity of the policy administrator, the integrity
of the received policy, and it checks whether the administra-
tor is allowed perform this management action. Finally, if
allowed, the policy is safely distributed to the sensor node
using one of the standard WSN security solutions [4].
As this distribution architecture provides support for dy-
namic deployment of new policies, the framework can be
adapted according to evolving application demands over time.
3. STATUS AND FUTUREWORK
We have realized and evaluated [3] an initial implementa-
tion of the proposed architecture for the Sun SPOT [5] sen-
sor node platform. This implementation addresses the con-
cerns of providing flexible and fine-grained security support
while respecting the resource-constrained nature of WSNs
in terms of memory footprint and performance overhead.
Future work will focus upon three key fronts (i.) extend-
ing our security architecture to consider more complex ap-
plication scenarios, (ii.) real world user trials in a logistics
scenario [2], and (iii.) expansion of our policy language to
support the enforcement of more security operations such as
selective encryption of data flows between two components.
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